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1 Introduction
In 2017, the UK Supreme Court (‘the Supreme Court’) decided what
was, prematurely, referred to as the ‘Constitutional Case of the Century’:
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union v R (Miller) (‘Secretary of State
for Exiting the EU v Miller ’).1 However, within three years, the Supreme
Court decided R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General
for Scotland (‘Miller v The Prime Minister ’), which arguably has even greater
constitutional importance.2 Given the number of similarities between the
cases, this is hardly surprising. They provide the only examples, to date,
of the Supreme Court sitting with its maximum number of eleven Justices.
Both arose in the context of Brexit, involved key constitutional questions
as to the relative powers of the legislature, the executive, and the courts
and received a huge amount of media attention. Unsurprisingly, they both
generated a great deal of commentary prior to, during, and after the cases
were heard.3
* Sir DavidWilliams Professor of Public Law, University of Cambridge; Fellow of Robinson
College, Cambridge. I am very grateful to Paul Craig, Hayley J Hooper and Leah Trueblood
for comments on an earlier version. All responsibility for errors rests with the author alone.
1 [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61.
2 [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373.
3 See eg the coverage of Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) on the following blogs:
UK Constitutional Law Blog <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/> accessed 9 May
2020; Judicial Power Project <https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/> accessed 9 May
2020; UKSC Blog <http://ukscblog.com/> accessed 9 May 2020. See also Mark El-
liott, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgment in Cherry/Miller (No 2): A new approach
to constitutional adjudication?’ (Public Law For Everyone, 24 September 2019)
<https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/09/24/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-
cherry-miller-no-2-a-new-approach-to-constitutional-adjudication/> accessed 9 May
2020.
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At first, Miller v The Prime Minister may have appeared to be less dramatic
than Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller. Given the relative speed
with whichMiller v The Prime Minister went through the Divisional Court,
the Outer and Inner House of the Court of Session, and, eventually,
the Supreme Court, the media circus outside the Supreme Court was
slightly more subdued than that of Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v
Miller. However, there was still live coverage and commentary of the case
on mainstream UK news channels. The consequences of the decision,
however, were farmore dramatic. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU vMiller
concluded that the prerogative powers relating to foreign relations did not
include a power to notify the European Council of the UK’s intention to
withdraw from the European Union Treaties, given that to do so would
modify domestic law and frustrate the European Communities Act 1972.
Whilst this did require the UK Parliament to enact legislation to empower
the Prime Minister to notify the European Council,4 contrary to some
commentary at the time, this did not prevent the UK from leaving the
European Union (‘the EU’) on 31 January 2020. Miller v The Prime Minister
established common law limits on the prerogative power of prorogation,
concluding that the extensive prorogation of Parliament in the run up
to what could have been the UK’s exit date from the EU was a serious
limitation on parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability
for which the Government had failed to provide any, let alone a reasonable,
justification. The judgment reversed the prorogation of the UKParliament.
As far as the law was concerned, the prorogation was ultra vires and
quashed. Parliament had never been prorogued. Consequently, Bills
introduced during the 2017-19 session of Parliament that had not yet
received royal assent had not lapsed. Therewas also confusion as towhether
the royal assent for the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration andRenewals)
Bill 2019, which was included on the same piece of paper that had informed
the UK Parliament that it was to be prorogued, had also lapsed.5
Furthermore, Miller v The Prime Minister will potentially have a greater
impact on the UK constitution than Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v
Miller. It further develops the control over prerogative powers established
in Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller. Both cases focused on
determining the extent to which the common law can place limits on
the extent of prerogative powers. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v
Miller established that prerogative powers cannot modify domestic law,
including removing domestic rights, or frustrate legislation, either through
frustrating specific legislative provisions or by rendering legislation devoid
of its purpose. Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller also drew on
4 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017.
5 This is discussed in more depth in section 2.1 below.
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constitutional principles – in particular, that it would be ‘inconsistent with
long-standing and fundamental principle for such a far-reaching change
to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by ministerial
decision or ministerial action alone’.6 Miller v The Prime Minister builds on
both of these legal developments. It explains that background constitutional
principles can be used to shape the legal limits the common law places on
the scope of prerogative powers. In particular, it provides a more expansive
analysis of parliamentary sovereignty and clearly recognises parliamentary
accountability as a fundamental constitutional principle for the first time.
Both are used to determine the specific scope of the prerogative power of
prorogation.
Unsurprisingly, the case has already attracted an array of commentary. As
my early contributions makes clear, I am in the camp of those supporting
the decision of the Supreme Court.7 In this chapter, I aim to explain
further why this is the case. I will first analyse some of the main criticisms
of the case. I do so not just to present my opinion on these criticisms,
but also to illustrate two themes running through these criticisms: comity
and deference. Arguments from comity argue that the Supreme Court in
Miller v The Prime Minister failed to recognise that the court has no role
as regards the prerogative power of prorogation other than to recognise
it exists. This is because it is for either the Monarch or Parliament, or
both, to regulate how this prerogative power is exercised. Arguments
from deference recognise that courts can play a role in controlling the
prerogative but that the Supreme Court transgressed the proper limits of
its role, crossing the important divide between legal and political controls.
The second substantive section will build on these criticisms, arguing that
they reflect deeper tensions as to the definition of ‘Parliament’ and the
relative power of the legislature and the executive. In particular, those who
criticise the judgment place more emphasis on the power of the executive,
whereas those who support the judgment argue that the legislature is more
constitutionally important than the executive. I will refer to the former
as a preference for a Whitehall vision of democracy, and the second as
a preference for a Westminster vision of democracy. I will argue that
the Supreme Court, rightly, adopts a Westminster vision of democracy.
Finally, I will provide a further normative defence of the decision based on
an analysis of inter-institutional interactions. The decision of the Supreme
6 Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller (n 1) [81].
7 Alison Young, ‘Prorogation, Politics and the Principle of Legality’ (UK Constitutional Law
Blog, 13 September 2019) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/13/alison-young-
prorogation-politics-and-the-principle-of-legality/> accessed 9 May 2020, Alison Young,
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Court can be defended as a form of constitutional counterbalancing, the
Supreme Court ensuring that the executive does not usurp power from
the legislature in circumstances where the legislature is unable to ensure
its powers are not usurped by the executive.
2 Clearing the Ground: Six Short Criticisms
I must first explain my reason for dealing with these six criticisms in a more
concise manner than I will deal with other criticisms of the judgment. This
is not a reflection on the quality of these criticisms. Rather, I recognise that
these criticisms have been dealt with in depth elsewhere,8 including in this
volume.9 To a large extent, I agree with the response to these criticisms and
have less to add than I might otherwise have done.
The first two criticisms focus on the way in which the Supreme Court
analysed the facts when it reached its conclusion, as well as criticising the
SupremeCourt’s choice of a quashing order as themost appropriate remedy.
I will argue that the Court’s factual analysis is defensible and that the
quashing order did not breach art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688. The second
pair of criticisms argue that the Supreme Court was the inappropriate body
to control the prerogative power of prorogation. Rather, the Queen and/or
Parliament alone should control this prerogative power. The final pair of
criticisms focus on how the Supreme Court reached its conclusion. The
judgment has been criticised for crossing the line between controls over
the existence and the exercise of a prerogative power. Also, it is argued
that, by relying on the principle of parliamentary authority, the Supreme
Court enforced a convention, contravening the clear line between law and
convention established in Secretary for Exiting the EU v Miller.
2.1 Factual Impact and Remedies
The Supreme Court’s decision recognised that the legal limits of the
prerogative power of prorogation depended upon whether the detrimental
impact of prorogation on parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary
accountability was sufficiently serious to merit court control. The Court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence. Parliament was to be
prorogued for five out of the eight weeks in the run up to 31 October
2019, the date set, at that time, for the UK’s exit from the EU. The Court
8 Paul Craig, ‘The Supreme Court, Prorogation and Constitutional Principle’ [2020] Public
Law 248; Martin Loughlin, ‘A Note on Craig onMiller; Cherry’ [2020] Public Law 278; and
Paul Craig, ‘Response to Loughlin’s Note onMiller; Cherry’ [2020] Public Law 282.
9 Paul Craig, ‘Constitutionality, Convention and Prorogation’ in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK
Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 10: 2018-2019 Legal Year (Appellate Press 2021).
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recognised that Brexit was a fundamental change to the UK constitution; an
issue on which Parliament deserved to have a voice. The Court recognised
that, although the period over which Parliament would be prorogued also
included periods in which Parliament would normally be in recess for party
conferences, nevertheless prorogation had a larger impact on parliamentary
sovereignty and parliamentary accountability than a recess. Parliament
is still able to conduct its business whilst in recess, the House of Lords
continues to sit, and Parliamentary Committees can still conduct their
business. The same is not true when Parliament is prorogued, not to
mention that this brings a parliamentary session to an end, meaning that
Bills that have not progressed through Parliament also, normally, lapse.10
The Supreme Court’s analysis of these facts has been criticised. Did the
Courtmerely hypothesise about an impact that it was impossible to assess?11
Moreover, did the Court fail to pay sufficient deference to the reasons
provided by the Prime Minister for such a long prorogation?12 Neither of
these criticisms negates nor undermines the decision of the Supreme Court.
First, it has to be recognised that no specific evidence was presented to the
Court by the Government concerning the justification for the prorogation.
Courts can only take account of the evidence presented to them; it would
be wrong for courts to engage with speculation found elsewhere.
Furthermore, when dealing with cases that have large constitutional
consequences, the courts should ensure that all possible future impacts are
assessed in order to ensure that fundamental constitutional principles are
not eroded. In Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller, for example,
one of the issues before the court was whether it would be the case that, in
the period between notifying the EU of the UK’s intention to leave the EU
and the UK’s exit from the EU, no legislation would be enacted to remove,
or preserve, domestic rights derived from the EU. If so, then domestic
law would have been modified by an act of the prerogative alone. Lord
Carnwath’s dissent was critical of the decision of the majority because it
was acting on an assumption. Nobody knew whether legislation would be
enacted prior to the UK’s exit from the EU. In reaching its conclusion, the
Supreme Court had essentially assumed that it would not be. Yet, there was
10 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [56]-[57].
11 John Finnis, ‘The Law of the Constitution before the Court: Supplementary Notes
on The Unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court’s prorogation judgment’ (Policy
Exchange, 2019) <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/The-Law-of-the-
Constitution-before-the-Court.pdf> accessed 9 May 2020, 21-22.
12 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Case of Prorogation: The UK Constitutional Council’s ruling on
the appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court’ (Policy Exchange, 2019) <https://
policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Case-of-Prorogation.pdf> ac-
cessed 9 May 2020, 18-21.
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no basis for adopting this assumption.13
However, I would argue that: when faced with a range of possible
assumptions as to future action; in circumstances where waiting to see
which of these possible future actions occurs would render a legal challenge
devoid of its purpose; andwhere there are large constitutional consequences
of one of these possible future actions; the courts should act on the
assumption of the worst case scenario. In earlier work, I have called
this the ‘constitutional precautionary principle’.14 In Secretary of State for
Exiting the EU v Miller, this meant assuming that no legislation would be
enacted to remove, modify, or preserve domestic law. InMiller v The Prime
Minister, this meant recognising that proroguing Parliament would remove
the ability of the legislature to hold the executive to account in the run up to
Brexit, particularly given the tension between the wishes of the legislature
and the executive concerning the possibility that the UK could leave the EU
on 31 October 2019 with no deal.
In terms of the remedy, the Supreme Court effectively quashed the
prorogation order. In doing so, the Court has been criticised for acting
contrary to art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. Arguably, prorogation is
a proceeding in Parliament in a similar manner to royal assent.15 Both
involve the Queen – part of the Queen-in-Parliament. So, if royal assent
is a proceeding in Parliament, surely the same is true of prorogation?16
However, the argument does not follow. I agree with Craig and Elliott
that the act of the Monarch signing royal assent and the act of the
Monarch proroguing Parliament are distinct. Royal assent is a proceeding
in Parliament as it is needed in order to make an Act of Parliament.
Prorogation is an Act of theMonarch, on the advice of herMinisters, which
is then reported to Parliament.17 The House of Commons and the House
of Lords have no ability to challenge a prorogation when it is announced
to them in Parliament.18 But both need to give their consent to legislation
13 Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller (n 1) [81], [265]-[267].
14 See Alison L Young, ‘Miller and the Future of Constitutional Adjudication’ in Mark Elliott,
JackWilliams and Alison L Young (eds), The UK Constitution after Miller: Brexit and Beyond
(Hart Publishing 2018), 277, 298-301.
15 Finnis (n 11), 7-8.
16 Barclay v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 54, [2015] AC 276.
17 See Craig, ‘The Supreme Court, Prorogation and Constitutional Principle’ (n 8); Mark
Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgment in Cherry/ Miller (No 2): A new Approach
to Constitutional Adjudication?’ (Public Law For Everyone, 24 September 2019)
<https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/09/24/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-
cherry-miller-no-2-a-new-approach-to-constitutional-adjudication/> accessed 9 May
2020.
18 See Anne Twomey, ‘Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 and Its Application to Prorogation’
(UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 4 October 2019) <https://ukconstitu-
tionallaw.org/2019/10/04/anne-twomey-article-9-of-the-bill-of-rights-1688-and-its-
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(subject to the provisions of the Parliament Acts 1911-1949).
Loughlin takes this criticism further, arguing that, in quashing the proroga-
tion of Parliament, the court also quashed royal assent of the Parliamentary
Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill 2019, contravening not only art
9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, but also the rule that courts do not question
an Act of Parliament duly entered on to the parliamentary roll.19 The royal
assent for the Bill was contained on the same paper as the prorogation or-
der. When describing the consequences of the quashing order, the Supreme
Court stated that it was ‘as if the Commissioners hadwalked into Parliament
with a blank piece of paper.’20 Consequently, quashing the prorogation also
quashed royal assent.
However, this criticism confuses a metaphor with reality. As Yuan Yi Zhu
and Craig note, the Supreme Court may have used the phrase ‘a blank piece
of paper’ to describe the effects of a quashing order to the public, but this
did not mean that it quashed both royal assent and the prorogation order.
The two were clearly severable and the Court’s judgment only applied to
the prorogation order.21 Whilst this may have caused confusion, with
the Commissioners concluding that royal assent would have to be given
again to the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill, this
is best understood as the Commissioners erring on the side of caution in
constitutionally novel circumstances. The Supreme Court’s judgment did
not require that royal assent be quashed.
Running through these criticisms are concerns as to the proper role of the
courts, the executive, and the legislature. The Supreme Court is criticised
not just because it may have got the facts wrong, but because the court
should not be carrying out such an analysis precisely because it is not within
its relative area of expertise, meaning it is more likely to make mistakes. If
the Supreme Court issued the wrong remedy, it was because, in quashing
the order to prorogue, it interfered with the powers of Parliament. These
themes are developed further in the next set of criticisms.
application-to-prorogation/> accessed 9 May 2020.
19 Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & Fin 810; British Railways Board
v Pickin [1976] AC 765.
20 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [69].
21 Yuan Yi Zhu, ‘Putting Royal Assent in Doubt? One Implication of the Supreme
Court’s Prorogation Judgment’ (Policy Exchange, 2019) <https://policyexchange.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Putting-Royal-Assent-in-Doubt.pdf> accessed 9 May 2020;
Craig (n 8).
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2.2 Comity
The following arguments concern the justiciability of the prerogative power
of prorogation, drawing on arguments of comity.22 The courts should
not control the prerogative power precisely because this is the role of
Parliament, or the Monarch, or both to control prorogation. Respect for
the relative roles of the institutions of the constitutionsmean that the courts
have no role to play.
First, it has been argued that theMonarch controls the prerogative power of
prorogation, not the courts.23 Prorogation is a personal prerogative of the
Queen. There are conventions governing how the Monarch can exercise
this power. Moreover, a reserve power may exist which enables the Queen
to refuse to prorogue Parliament, even when advised by her Ministers
to do so.24 Finnis and Ekins argue that this may exist in exceptional
circumstances. For example, this would arise were Ministers to advise the
Monarch to prorogue Parliament in order to avoid a potential vote of no
confidence in the Government,25 or when it is clear that the Government
has lost the confidence of the House of Commons.26 Spadijer goes so far as
to argue in favour of the Monarch as the ‘guardian of the Constitution’;
one that is able to operate subtly behind the scenes through using her
conventional power to advise, encourage, and warn her Government,
rather than using the blunt instrument of legality.27 All three argue that,
to fail to recognise this role of the Monarch is to effectively remove the
Monarch from the UK constitution.
However, I would argue that it is far from clear that only the Queen,
either in tandem with Parliament or acting on her own, has the power to
control a potential abuse of prorogation. Although there are examples of the
executive acting in this manner, they are drawn from other legal systems,
most of which involve a Governor General as opposed to a Monarch.
Governor Generals are appointed, they do not merely inherit their role.
22 See Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (4th edn, OUP 2018), ch 7.
23 Finnis (n 11) 18-20; Richard Ekins, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Poli-
tics of Prorogation’ (Policy Exchange, 2019) <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Parliamentary-Sovereignty-and-the-Politics-of-
Prorogation3.pdf> accessed 9 May 2020, 12; Steven Spadijer, ‘Prorogation, Justicia-
bility and the Reserve Powers’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 20 September 2020)
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/20/steven-spadijer-prorogation-justiciability-
and-the-reserve-powers/> accessed 9 May 2020.
24 For a more detailed account of these reserve powers, see Anne Twomey, The Veiled
Sceptre: Reserve Powers of Heads of State in Westminster Systems (CUP 2018); Anne Twomey,
‘Prorogation, the Queen and the Courts – A View FromAfar’ in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK
Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 10: 2018-2019 Legal Year (Appellate Press 2021).
25 Ekins (n 23) 12.
26 Finnis (n 11) 18-20.
27 Spadijer (n 23).
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This appointment – depending on themanner of the appointment process –
provides theGovernorGeneralwithmore legitimacy than the incumbent of
an inherited position.28 If the Governor General were to refuse to prorogue
Parliament, even though this refusal contravened the will of the people, it
is easier to hold the Governor General to account for her actions than it
would be to hold the Monarch to account.
Second, whilst there are conventions governing how theMonarch exercises
her prerogative powers, including the prerogative power of prorogation,
there are also other conventions relevant to the assessment of the role
of the Monarch. This includes the convention that the Monarch should
remain politically neutral. If the Monarch were to intervene and refuse to
prorogue Parliament, despite being advised by her Ministers to do so, she
could undermine her political neutrality. Allowing the courts to provide a
constitutional check on the use of the prerogative, through the development
of the legal limits on the prerogative, provides a more legitimate form of
a constitutional backstop, with the courts drawing on legal principles. In
addition, the intervention of the courts does not prevent theMonarch from
exercising her constitutional role. Instead, it ensures that the Monarch
continues to maintain her legitimate role in the Constitution. The Queen
is still in a position to advise, warn and encourage her Ministers; including
about the wisdom of proroguing Parliament at any particular time. If her
role is eroded, it would be if this opportunity were avoided, by announcing
a future prorogation before providing the Monarch with the possibility of
encouraging, warning or advising on this matter.
Third, it is important to recognise that the Monarch is part of the Crown.
Yet, the Crown does not purely consist of the Monarch. The Crown refers
also to Governmental Ministers, Ministers of the Crown exercising powers
on behalf of theMonarch. Whilst theremay be conventions governing how
these powers are exercised, nevertheless, it is more legitimate for another
body to check that the Crown acts legitimately than for one aspect of the
Crown to check on another aspect of the Crown.
A second criticism is that only Parliament, either in tandem with the
Monarch or by itself, is empowered to check on the use of the prerogative
power of prorogation.29 Most of these arguments focus on the extent to
28 Finnis and Ekins refer to examples from Canada and Australia. The Canadian Governor
General is appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Canadian Prime Minister, the
convention being that such appointments are for five years and, until the most recent
appointment, an emerging practice had arisen of using an appointments panel. Australia
also appoints a Governor General, normally for a term of five years, on the advice of the
Australian Prime Minister.
29 See Timothy Endicott, ‘Don’t Panic’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 13 September
2020 <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/13/timothy-endicott-dont-panic/>
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which Parliament holds the Government to account through the conven-
tion that the Government only holds power to the extent that it enjoys the
confidence of the House. As the Prime Minister issued the order to pro-
rogue Parliament on 28 August 2019, the prorogation being scheduled to
commence between 9 and 12 October 2019, Parliament had the opportu-
nity to control the Government. The leader of the opposition had the op-
portunity to ask for a vote of no confidence in the Government, but chose
not to. Consequently, Parliament must have decided that the prorogation
was legitimate, for the court to reach the opposite conclusion would be for
the court to usurp its role, trespassing on the powers of Parliament.30
Stephen Tierney’s argument goes further, drawing on issues of justiciability
which will be discussed in more depth below. He argues that there is a
distinction between prerogative powers that have been subject to judicial
review in the past – eg the prerogative power to regulate employment affairs
at GCHQ – and the prerogative power of prorogation. The prerogatives
that the courts have controlled in the past concerned individual rights.
The prerogative power of prorogation concerns the relations between the
branches of government – here between the executive and the legislature.
Tierney argues that it is not for the courts to intervene when rights are not
involved, it being instead the role of the legislature to check on the executive
to ensure that prerogative powers are not abused, with one institution
transgressing on the powers of another.31
I have two arguments to make in response. First, I accept the distinction
drawn by Tierney exists. However, I would argue that this does not lead to
the conclusion that the prerogative power of prorogation is non-justiciable
and cannot be controlled by the courts at all. Rather, I would argue that this
distinction explains why the prerogative of prorogation can be checked by
the courts in terms of its legality, but that it is not the role of the court to go
further and challenge the reasonableness of the choice made by the Prime
Minister to advise the Monarch to prorogue Parliament. 32
Second, I would argue that any assessment of whether Parliament had the
opportunity to hold a vote of no confidence, and chose not to exercise
this, has to take account of all of the facts. The 2017-19 parliamentary
accessed 9 May 2020; Stephen Tierney, ‘Prorogation and the Courts: A Ques-
tion of Sovereignty’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 17 Sep 2020) <https://uk-
constitutionallaw.org/2019/09/17/stephen-tierney-prorogation-and-the-courts-
a-question-of-sovereignty/> accessed 9 May 2020,; Danny Nicol, ‘The Supreme
Court against the People’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 25 September 2020)
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/25/danny-nicol-supreme-court-against-
the-people/> accessed 9 May 2020.
30 See Loughlin (n 12); Loughlin (n 8).
31 Finnis makes a similar point in (n 11) 13-14.
32 See also Craig (n 9) for a strong rejection of this distinction.
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session was unique not just in terms of its length, but also in terms of
the composition of Parliament. The Conservative Government started the
session as a minority Government, shored up by a ‘confidence and supply’
agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (‘DUP’). As the session
progressed, and the divisions across and within political parties over Brexit
deepened, backbenchMPswho voted against theGovernment had thewhip
removed, further reducing the potential number of votes the Government
could count on to secure the enactment of its legislation. In addition, art
50 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) placed a further restriction
on Parliament. It placed a time limit on the Brexit negotiation process that
could not be unilaterally modified by the United Kingdom. There was not
just the clock counting down to the prorogation of Parliament; there was
also the clock counting down to Brexit.
In these circumstances, backbench and opposition MPs chose to work
together to enact the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019,
designed to prevent the UK leaving the EU on 31 October 2019 with no
deal, rather than initiating a vote of no confidence. This was a policy choice.
Whilst the indicative votes in response to Governmental statements issued
for the purposes of s 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018
may not have provided a consensus regarding the UK’s future relationship
with the European Union, they did demonstrate a consensus in the House
of Commons that the UK should not leave the EUwith no deal. The timing
of the prorogation made leaving with no deal more likely. Are we to read
these facts as Parliament not wishing to prevent the prorogation, when it
could have done so, or as Parliament choosing to demonstrate its lack of
confidence in a particular Governmental policy and acting to prevent it? It
may not have been possible to do both. Moreover, the vote of no confidence
may have also had the consequence of the UK’s leaving the EUwith no deal.
Whilst the courts can be aware of these political choices, it is not their job
to choose between them, which they may have indirectly done had they
concluded that the courts could not intervene as Parliament could have
held, but chose not to hold, a vote of no confidence in the Government.
It is perfectly acceptable for courts to determine whether Ministers had a
legal power to act, particularly when this not only ensures that the courts
are not determining political choices but, moreover, refusing to control the
prerogative power in this manner could also be interpreted as a political
choice.
2.3 Institutional and Epistemic Deference
The final pair of criticisms concern issues of institutional or epistemic
deference. Arguments based on comity assert that it is not the place of
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the courts to regulate the prerogative power of prorogation at all. Courts
should not intervene in order to respect the constitutional roles of the
Monarch and Parliament. Arguments from institutional and epistemic
deference differ from arguments of comity in two ways. First, deference
does not apply on an all or nothing basis, it applies in degrees. Rather
than arguing that the court should not intervene, arguments fromdeference
would argue that the courts should check the actions of the executive,
but do so less stringently than it may control other acts of the executive.
Second, the justifications for institutional and epistemic deference differ
from the justification for comity. Institutional deference recognises that a
particular institution is better placed to determine a specific issue, normally
because the institution has better access to certain information than other
institutions. Epistemic deference recognises that institutions develop
expertise in particular areas. Even if both the courts and the executive have
access to the same facts, for example, the expertise of the courts or that of
the executive may mean that they are better able to evaluate a particular set
of facts.
Why is it the case that the Supreme Court was insufficiently deferential in
Miller v The Prime Minister? First, it is argued that the Court transformed
a constitutional convention into an enforceable legal principle. This
is because the Court used the principle of parliamentary accountability
when establishing the common law limits of the prerogative power of
prorogation. Yet, parliamentary accountability is really a convention
and not a legal principle. Finnis appears to argue, in addition, that, as
there are conventions already governing how the prerogative power of
prorogation should be exercised, there is no need for any further legal
controls. However, as Craig rightly argues, Finnis’s argument wrongly
regards conventions as being capable of being a legal shield.33 Loughlin
provides a different justification, arguing that courts should not enforce
parliamentary accountability as they do not possess the requisite knowledge
of, and expertise in, politics to do so.34
However, as both Paul Craig35 and Mark Elliott36 conclude, the Supreme
Court did not enforce a convention when it relied on parliamentary ac-
countability to establish limits on the prerogative power of prorogation.
Parliamentary accountability is best understood as a constitutional princi-
ple. It is more abstract than a convention or a legal doctrine. Moreover,
it can provide both a good justification for adopting a constitutional con-
vention or for developing a legal doctrine. The convention of Ministerial
33 Craig (n 9).
34 Loughlin (n 12) 16-18.
35 Craig (n 9).
36 Elliott (n 17).
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responsibility, for example, is a means of upholding parliamentary account-
ability. The legal doctrine that prerogative powers cannot modify domestic
law is an illustration of, and is arguably underpinned by, the principle of
parliamentary accountability.37
Adam Perry is critical of this solution. He argues that, just because
parliamentary accountability is a principle, that does not mean that it
cannot also be a convention.38 Whilst this is logically true, it does not
prove that the Supreme Court thereby enforced a convention. To answer
this, we need to investigate further how parliamentary accountability
was used in Miller v The Prime Minister. The Supreme Court does not
enforce parliamentary accountability per se. Rather, it uses the principle
of parliamentary accountability, alongside parliamentary sovereignty, to
determine the specific legal limits placed on the prerogative power of
prorogation. The Court makes it clear that it regards parliamentary
accountability as a ‘fundamental principle of our constitutional law’.39 After
setting out this principle, alongside parliamentary sovereignty, the Supreme
Court provides its specific account of the relevant limits on the prerogative
power of prorogation:
that a decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the
monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the pro-
rogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without
reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out
its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body re-
sponsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situa-
tion, the courts will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious
to justify such an exceptional course.40
Regardless of whether parliamentary accountability is both a principle
and a convention, the Supreme Court was not enforcing parliamentary
accountability per se. Rather, itwas relying on the principle of parliamentary
accountability to determine the specific legal limits of the prerogative power
of prorogation, using the principle to develop a specific common law
doctrine.
This insight also explains my response to Loughlin’s criticism. If the courts
were trying to enforce parliamentary accountability by acting in a similar
37 Case of Proclamations (1610) 12 Co Rep 74; Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller (n 1).
38 Adam Perry, ‘Enforcing Principles, Enforcing Conventions’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog,
3 December 2019) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/12/03/adam-perry-enforcing-
principles-enforcing-conventions/> accessed 9 May 2020.
39 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [41] and [46].
40 ibid [50].
369
2018–2019 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook Volume 10
manner to Parliament when enforcing the convention of Ministerial ac-
countability, then I would agree that courts are not best-placed institution-
ally to perform this function. They do not possess the same information or
expertise as Parliament. However, the courts are not enforcing this con-
vention. Rather, they are performing a task that is within their expertise,
drawing on case law to demonstrate the existence of the principle of par-
liamentary accountability in the UK constitution and using this to establish
legal doctrine.
The second criticism which draws on institutional and epistemic deference
argues that the Supreme Court mistakenly classified a control as to the
exercise of a prerogative power as a control over the existence of a
prerogative power. Since the GCHQ case,41 courts have been able to
review not just the existence, but also the exercise, of a prerogative power.
However, courts may only review the exercise of justiciable prerogative
powers. The Supreme Court focused on controlling the existence of the
prerogative power of prorogation, examining its scope. By focusing on the
existence and extent of the prerogative, there was no need for the Court to
determine whether the prerogative power of prorogation was justiciable.42
However, it is argued that, when determining the extent of prorogation, the
Court, in reality, was examining how the prerogative power was exercised.
All of the criticisms of the Supreme Court argue that the distinction
between existence and exercise is fluid. I agree that it can be difficult to
draw a clear line between controls over the existence and the exercise of
a prerogative power. This is nothing new. In Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate,
for example, the House of Lords had to determine the scope of prerogative
powers, examining specifically whether the Crown could, if compensation
was paid, destroy property in order to stop it falling into enemy hands.43
The House of Lords assessed the case as one purely concerning the scope
of a prerogative power. But it could also have been defined differently –
the scope of the prerogative being that of destroying property in times of
emergency to prevent it falling into enemy hands, but this being subject to
a condition of its exercise that compensation should be paid.
The distinction between existence and exercise may be vague; but this does
not mean that it does not exist. Rather, it calls for a deeper examination of
why we delineate between courts controlling the existence and the exercise
of prerogative powers and whether the reasons for this distinction were
undermined in Miller v The Prime Minister. Finnis argues that the line was
41 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.
42 See Jack Williams, ‘Prerogative Powers After Miller: An Analysis in Four E’s’ in Elliott,
Williams and Young (n 14), 39.
43 [1965] AC 75.
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crossed by relying on the reasoning in the GCHQ case.44 He argues that
Lord Diplock’s account of the heads of review in the GCHQ case – illegality,
procedural impropriety, and rationality (with a potential in the future for
proportionality) – effectively define controls over the exercise, as opposed
to the existence, of a prerogative power. I agree with Paul Craig’s analysis
that this is to misinterpret the GCHQ case.45
Loughlin makes a different point. First, he explains how the Supreme
Court focuses on effects in its analysis; prorogation is unlawful if it ‘has
the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification,
the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a
legislature.’46 Loughlin argues that this blurs the line between existence
and exercise. Additionally, it requires the courts to evaluate conduct to
determinewhether prorogation is unlawful to determinewhether the effect
on Parliament’s ability to carry out its functions was ‘sufficiently serious’ to
trigger the intervention of the court.47 Moreover, the court needs to assess
whether there is a ‘reasonable justification’ for this effect. These evaluations
are more similar to an assessment of reasonableness or rationality than they
are to a determination of the scope of the prerogative power of prorogation.
I don’t agree with Loughlin’s criticism. However, to make this argument
more fully, I need to revisit these criticisms inmore depth below by drawing
out two themes running through the criticisms that draw on arguments
of deference. First, there is tension in the academic commentary as to
the relative power of the legislature and the executive, both of which are
components of the Queen-in-Parliament. Those critical of the judgment
regard the executive asmore important than the legislature. The executive’s
role is to govern. Whilst courts can play a role to protect individual
rights from being restricted by the administration, they should not interfere
with the ability of the executive to govern effectively. Those less critical
of the judgment tend to share the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
legislature is more important than the executive, recognising the role of
the court to protect rights and to uphold the separation of powers between
the legislature and the executive. I will argue that the latter is a better
interpretation of the UK constitution in the 21stcentury.
Second, disagreements as to whether the prerogative power of prorogation
is justiciable draw on arguments for legal and political controls. Those
critical of the Court’s judgment prefer political to legal controls. Those
in support of the judgment prefer legal to political controls. However, I
44 GCHQ (n 41).
45 Craig (n 9).
46 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [50].
47 ibid.
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will argue that this analysis oversimplifies analyses of the UK constitution.
It ignores the extent to which legal and political controls interact and can
work together to provide a better set of controls designed to prevent abuses
of governmental power. I will use these arguments to provide a distinct
normative defence of the decision of the Supreme Court.
3 Parliament: Whitehall or Westminster?
Miller v The Prime Minister uses the constitutional principles of parliamen-
tary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. However, there is a lack
of consensus as to the content of both principles, as well as of the use of
parliamentary accountability as a legal principle. This, in turn, illustrates a
tension between different conceptions of democracy. DavidHowarth refers
to this as a tension between the Whitehall and the Westminster visions.48
Drawing on the work of A H Birch, Howarth argues that the Whitehall
vision places the balance of power in the hands of the executive, under-
stood as the members of the Government in the House of Commons and
the House of Lords.49 TheWestminster vision places the balance of power
with the legislature, composed predominantly of opposition and backbench
MPs, supplemented by the House of Lords, recognising the more limited
power of the House of Lords which can normally delay but not veto legisla-
tion.50 Under theWestminster vision, the House of Commons is the centre
of political attention, holding theGovernment to account for its actions and
possessing the ultimate power to remove confidence from theGovernment.
Under the Whitehall vision, the Government is the centre of political at-
tention. Its role is to govern the country, supported by its backbenchers,
having the ability to push through its legislative agenda.
A preference for theWhitehall vision of the UK’s parliamentary democracy
runs through the work of Finnis, Loughlin and Ekins, all of whom criticise
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v The Prime Minister. Finnis, for
example, draws attention to the role of the Crown as an integral component
of the Queen-in-Parliament. By failing to account for the Crown as ‘an
integral part of Parliament’,51 the Supreme Court’s judgment provided a:
48 David Howarth, ‘Westminster versus Whitehall: Two Incompatible Views of the
Constitution’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 10 April 2019) <https://ukconstitution-
allaw.org/2019/04/10/david-howarth-westminster-versus-whitehall-two-incompatible-
views-of-the-constitution/> accessed 9 May 2020.
49 Anthony Harold Birch, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British
Constitution (Allen and Unwin 1964).
50 Parliaments Acts 1911-1949.
51 John Finnis, ‘The Unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court’s prorogation judg-
ment’ (Policy Exchange, 2 October 2019) <http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/the-
unconstitutionality-of-the-supreme-courts-prorogation-judgment-john-finnis/> accessed
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pinched, minimising description of what is in fact and in con-
stitutional reality the high and burdensome responsibility of
carrying on the government in the United Kingdom on be-
half of the free people that has elected its government by elect-
ing members of Parliament, a majority or sufficient plurality
of whom maintain confidence in the Ministers appointed by
the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister.52
In a similar manner, Loughlin criticises the judgment as it ‘removes the
Crown from its status as a source of authority’.53 For Loughlin:
[s]ince 1688, the British constitution has evolved around the
pivot of theCrown. TheCrown-in-Council expresses govern-
mental authority, the Crown-in-Council-in-Parliament sig-
nifies ultimate legislative authority, and judges acquire their
commission from appointment by the Crown. Asserting its
absolute independence after a decade of existence, the Supreme
Court now conceives of Parliament primarily as the forum of
(qualified?) democratic legitimacy and the Government as an
entity that depends on Parliament for its legitimacy.54
Ekins provides a similar account of the UK constitution. For Ekins, ‘[t]he
Crown summons Parliaments to help it govern’,55 and ‘[t]he government
of the country is carried out in the name of the Queen by ministers who are
responsible to the Houses of Parliament’.56 Moreover, whilst:
Parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental legal rule about
the legal standing of Acts of Parliament and about the plenary
(unlimited) law-making authority of the Queen-in-Parliament
[…] it does not encompass the whole of the constitution; it
does not entail that the House of Commons, which is part of
the Queen-in-Parliament, should itself govern.57
All of these statements illustrate a preference for the Whitehall, over
the Westminster, vision of democracy. They prioritise the role of the
9 May 2020 8.
52 ibid 10.
53 Loughlin (n 12) 6.
54 ibid 7.
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Crown and of the Government. Whilst Government may be accountable
to Parliament, it is the Government that holds centre stage in the UK
constitution.
In addition, the preference for the Whitehall vision is illustrated in Ekins’s
account of when, if at all, prorogation would be unconstitutional; if
Ministers were to seek prorogation either to avoid a vote of no confidence,
or where the Government was seeking to remain in office after confidence
has been withdrawn, using prorogation to avoid a general election.58
Similar limits are implied in the account of Finnis, who states that the
Monarch should always prorogue Parliament when advised to do so by
Ministers ‘still enjoying the confidence of the elected house.’59
AWhitehall vision of representative democracy also underpins arguments
from comity and institutional and epistemic deference, as well as criticisms
of the manner in which the Supreme Court evaluated the facts. Critics of
the Supreme Court’s judgment inMiller v The Prime Minister argue that the
Court failed to exercise comity and should have concluded that prorogation
was non-justiciable. Arguments from institution and epistemic deference
criticise Miller v The Prime Minister for transforming a convention into
a legally enforceable principle and for, in reality, controlling the exercise
as opposed to the existence and extent of a prerogative power. If the
Crown, either through the Monarch or her duly appointed Governmental
Ministers, is the focus of the Constitution, then it is unsurprising that only
the Crown should be able to control prorogation. Also, a Whitehall vision
recognises that the Government only holds the ability to govern to the
extent that it enjoys the confidence of the House. This explains why it
is for Parliament and not the courts to check the use of the prerogative
power of prorogation. Second, a Whitehall vision of democracy would
regard conventions as suited only to political and not legal enforcement,
as well as regarding the Commons as having greater expertise as to when
the Government is abusing its prerogative powers. Finally, if we adopt
a Whitehall vision of democracy, Parliament could and should have used
a vote of no confidence in the Government. The Government should
be able to continue to govern until it loses the confidence of the House.
For the Supreme Court to have interfered would have undermined this
fundamental convention of the UK constitution.
The decision of the Supreme Court inMiller v The Prime Minister, however,
supports aWestminster, as opposed to aWhitehall, vision of democracy.60
58 ibid 9.
59 Finnis (n 11) 19.
60 See Jack Simson Caird, ‘The Supreme Court and Parliament: The Constitutional
Status of Checks and Balances’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27 September 2019)
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This is illustrated, in particular, by the way in which the Supreme Court
describes the scope of parliamentary sovereignty and in its account of the
principle of parliamentary accountability. The Supreme Court asserts that
‘the effect which the courts have given to Parliamentary sovereignty is
not confined to recognising the status of the legislation enacted by the
Crown in Parliament as our highest form of law.’61 Rather, the courts
have also recognised parliamentary sovereignty in otherways. For example,
the courts protected the sovereignty of Parliament from being eroded
directly by concluding that prerogative powers cannot modify domestic
law.62 Courts have also ensured that prerogative powers do not erode
the sovereignty of Parliament indirectly, either by by-passing statutory
authority or through ‘rendering a statute nugatory through recourse to
the prerogative’.63 To reinforce this point, the Supreme Court cites
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who stated in Fire Brigades Union that ‘the
constitutional history of this country is the history of the prerogative
powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers of the
democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body’.64
Consequently, the Supreme Court concludes in Miller v The Prime Minister
that the sovereignty of Parliament would ‘be undermined as the founda-
tional principle of our constitution if the executive could, through the use
of the prerogative, prevent Parliament from exercising its legislative au-
thority for as long as it pleased.’65 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court refers to the legislative authority of Parliament needing to be pro-
tected from acts of the executive. This reflects aWestminster vision of rep-
resentative democracy. The legislature – constituted in the Commons by
backbench and opposition MPs – are at the centre of government, not the
executive. Under aWhitehall vision of representative democracy, the legis-
laturewould not need to be protected from acts of the executive in thisman-
ner. Rather, the legislature should either support the executive, or move a
vote of no confidence.
The Supreme Court’s conception of parliamentary accountability also
supports a Westminster, as opposed to a Whitehall, vision of democracy.
The Court describes this principle as follows:
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/09/27/jack-simson-caird-the-supreme-court-
and-parliament-the-constitutional-status-of-checks-and-balances/> accessed 9 May
2020.
61 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [41].
62 Case of Proclamations (n 37).
63 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [41]. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513; Secretary of State for Exiting the EU v Miller (n
1).
64 Fire Brigades Union (n 63) 522, cited inMiller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [41].
65 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [42].
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Ministers are accountable to Parliament through such mecha-
nisms as their duty to answer Parliamentary questions and to
appear before Parliamentary committees, and through Parlia-
mentary scrutiny of the delegated legislation which ministers
make. By these means, the policies of the executive are sub-
jected to consideration by the representatives of the electorate,
the executive is required to report, explain and defend its ac-
tions, and citizens are protected from the arbitrary exercise of
executive power.66
This account emphasises the role of the legislature in the UK constitution.
Backbench and opposition MPs hold the executive to account. In turn,
this upholds representative democracy. The Government is accountable
to Parliament and Parliament is accountable to the people. This check
over the executive by the legislature is designed to prevent the arbitrary
exercise of power. It places the legislature and not the executive at the
centre of the constitution. The Supreme Court asserted that ‘the longer
that Parliaments stands prorogued, the greater the risk that responsible
government may be replaced by unaccountable government: the antithesis
of the democratic model.’67 This statement fits with a Westminster, as
opposed to a Whitehall, vision of representative democracy.
The choice between celebrating and criticising the decision of the Supreme
Court inMiller v The Prime Minister, therefore, may depend, at least in part,
upon whether one adopts a Whitehall or a Westminster interpretation of
democracy. I would argue in favour of aWestminster version of democracy
for three reasons. First, whilst it is the case that both understandings
of democracy are logically possible, albeit not necessarily equally feasible
interpretations of the UK constitution, at the time of Miller v The Prime
Minister, the political reality was more accurately described as upholding
a Westminster, as opposed to a Whitehall, interpretation of democracy.68
This is evidenced by legislation – particularly the Fixed-Term Parliaments
Act 2011 and s 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 – as
well as the use of Standing Orders, particularly to facilitate the enactment
of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 and the European Union
(Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019.
Prior to the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, general elections were held
after the Monarch exercised her prerogative power to dissolve Parliament,
66 ibid [46].
67 ibid [48].
68 I would also argue that this was more historically accurate more generally, although space
precludes a detailed defence of this argument.
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acting, by convention, on the advice of herMinisters to do so, with perhaps
an additional reserve power to refuse to dissolve Parliament in exceptional
circumstances.69 This placed the balance of power in the hands of the
executive. Subject to legislation providing for the maximum length of a
parliamentary term,70 a Prime Minister could choose the date of a general
election that she believed to maximise her party’s chances of re-election.
In addition, given the convention that a Government losing a vote of no
confidence would resign and ask for the dissolution of Parliament to trigger
a general election, a Prime Minister could use a vote of no confidence
to stymie a potential backbench rebellion. Whilst backbench MPs may
have been willing to vote against a particular piece of legislation, or to
back an opposition amendment to Governmental legislation, they may be
less willing to do so if that were to potentially lead to a general election
and the possibility that they would not be selected to stand as an MP for
their constituency, or that the MP may lose his seat at the ensuing general
election. Both of these powers strengthened the role of the executive against
the legislature.
The Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 fixes parliamentary terms at five
years, setting the dates of future general elections. The Act provides two
ways in which an early parliamentary general electionmay take place. First,
two-thirds of the 650 members of the House of Commons may vote in
favour of a motion for an early parliamentary general election.71 Second,
the House of Commons, by a simple majority, could vote in favour of
motion of no confidence in the Government. Following this vote of no
confidence, the House has 14 days in which to form a Government, and to
vote in favour of a motion of confidence in that Government, or the House
of Commons, dissolves and a general election takes place.72 Consequently,
the Act potentially transfers power from the executive to the legislature. A
Prime Minister may not simply advise the Monarch to dissolve Parliament
and hold a general election. Any general election requires a vote in favour
from two-thirds of the House of Commons or runs the risk that the House
of Commons could offer a vote of confidence in an alternative Government
to the one seeking an early parliamentary general election, without a general
election taking place.
The political reality may attest to the fact that it can sometimes be easy for
the Prime Minister to obtain these votes, as was the case with the vote
69 Twomey, The Veiled Sceptre (n 24); Twomey, ‘Prorogation, the Queen and the Courts’ (n
24).
70 Prior to the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, the limit of five years was found in the
Parliament Act 1911, s 7.
71 Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, ss 2(1) and 2(2).
72 ibid ss 2(3) to 2(5).
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for an early parliamentary general election on 19 April 2017, where 522
MPs voted in favour and only 13 MPs voted against an early parliamentary
general election.73 This led some to suggest that, given the importance of
a general election, the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 did nothing to
alter the balance of power. However, the events of 2019 would suggest
that political context is key. Boris Johnson tried, and failed, three times
to obtain a vote in favour of an early parliamentary general election.74
Whether one deplores the outcome of these votes and the consequence of
the Act as creating a zombie Parliament, or applauds the Act for providing
the legislature with the means to prevent the actions of a Government that
did not have a working majority in the House, depends upon whether one
prefers a Whitehall or a Westminster vision of democracy.
Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 also provides
support for the accuracy of a Westminster as opposed to a Whitehall
vision of democracy. This provision provided the legal conditions for
the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the
EU. It could not be ratified unless: a Minister of the Crown laid before
Parliament a statement that agreement had been reached, as well as a copy
of the Withdrawal Agreement and a copy of the framework for the future
relationship between the UK and the EU;75 there was a vote of the House of
Commons in favour of adopting both the Withdrawal Agreement and the
framework for a future relationship and a motion in the House of Lords to
take note of this vote;76 and an Act of Parliament was enacted to implement
the Withdrawal Agreement.77
Treaties are normally ratified through their provisions being laid before
Parliament, Parliament having the opportunity to vote against the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty within 21 sitting days. If there is no such vote, then
the Treaty is ratified. Moreover, this procedure can be avoided when it is
urgent for the Treaty to be ratified without being laid before Parliament
in this manner, with the ability of Parliament to vote against this ratifi-
cation. The Government may still ratify a Treaty if Parliament has voted
against this ratification, if a Minister of the Crown lays before Parliament a
statement that the Treaty should nevertheless be ratified and provides the
reasons for this ratification.78 These normal provisions for the ratification
of a Treaty clearly place the balance of power with the executive as opposed
73 HC Deb 19 April 2017, vol 624, cols 708-12.
74 HC Deb 4 September 2019, vol 664, cols 314-15; HC Deb 9 September 2019, vol 664, cols
637-39; HC Deb 28 October 2019, vol 667, cols 77-79.
75 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 13(1)(a).
76 ibid s 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(c).
77 ibid s 13(1)(d).
78 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, ss 20 to 25.
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to the legislature.
The 2018 Act, therefore, provides a shift in the balance of power from
the executive to the legislature, providing the legislature with more of a
say in the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement than was the case for
other Treaties. The House of Commons voted against the Withdrawal
Agreement on three occasions: 15 January 2019; 12 March 2019; and 25
March 2019.79 The first vote marked the largest Governmental defeat
since the establishment of universal suffrage. Further provisions of s 13
reinforced this potential move away from a Whitehall to a Westminster
vision of democracy. If the House of Commons did not vote in favour of
theWithdrawal Agreement or the framework for a future relationship, the
Government was required to make a statement to the House of Commons,
followed by a motion in neutral term in response to this statement in
the Commons and a motion in the House of Lords to take note of the
statement.80 Similar requirements were in place should the Minister make
a statement that it would not be possible, in principle, for a Withdrawal
Agreement to be made by 21 January 2019,81 or if by the end of 21 January
2019 no agreement in principle had been reached.82 These provisions led
to a series of so-called ‘meaningful votes’.83 Again, this illustrates a relative
transfer of power from the executive to the legislature.
Further evidence of this move from a predominantly Whitehall, to a
predominantly Westminster, vision of democracy can be found in the way
in which the Speaker interpreted and applied some of the Standing Orders
governing the conduct of behaviour in the House of Commons. Standing
Order No 14 provides support for a strong executive by prioritising the
business of the Government.84 These provisions make it very difficult
for a Private Members’ Bill to be enacted through Parliament, these Bills
only have ‘precedence over government business on thirteen Fridays in
each session.’85 Nevertheless, in the 2017-19 session, two Private Members
Bills were enacted – the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 and the
EuropeanUnion (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 – both of which instructed
the Prime Minister at the time to do something she or he did not wish to
do, seek an extension to the art 50 negotiation process and neither of which
79 HC Deb 15 January 2019, vol 652, cols 1122-1125; HC Deb 12 March 2019, vol 656, cols
291-295; HC Deb 25 March 2019, vol 657, cols 60-145.
80 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 13(3)-(6).
81 ibid s 13(7)-(9).
82 ibid s 13(10)-(12).
83 See, for example, votes on motions on 29 January 2019, 14 February 2019, 27 February
2019, 13 March 2019, 14 March 2019 and 1 April 2019.
84 Standing Order No 14(1) provides that: ‘Save as provided in this order, government
business shall have precedence at every sitting.’
85 Standing Order No 14(8).
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had been allocated time through the usual process of a ballot for Private
Members’ Bills.
The enactment of both of these Private Members’ Bills required a novel
interpretation of the Standing Order rules, the most striking of which was
the interpretation of Standing Order No 24 by the Speaker on 3 September
2019. Standing Order No 24 allows for a Member of the House to propose
that the House ‘should debate a specific and important matter that should
have urgent consideration’. If the Speaker allows thismotion, it is supported
by sufficient Members of the House and the House votes in favour of
this motion, then a ‘debate shall be held on a motion that the House has
considered the specified matter’. Prior to this date, it was understood that
this Standing Order only provided for a neutral motion, which would not
be capable of having substantive consequences. However, on 3 September
2019, the Speaker allowed this to be used to debate a motion to suspend
Standing Order No 14, and, instead, propose a timetable for all of the stages
of the EuropeanUnion (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Bill 2019 to be rushed through
Parliament on that day. This vote having succeeded, the Bill then proceeded
through the Commons in one day, before being enacted quickly through the
House of Lords after a failed attempt to prevent the modification of their
Standing Orders to permit this. Once more, this illustrates a change in the
relative balance of power between the executive and the legislature, from a
Whitehall to a Westminster vision of democracy.
I would argue that the Supreme Court in Miller v The Prime Minister
was right to recognise this potential move to the Westminster vision of
democracy. If we are to expect the SupremeCourt to be sensitive to political
realities when deciding key constitutional issues, then we should expect the
Court to take account of the political reality at the time, not that of the past
or a potential future. In addition, I would argue that there are, further,
normative reasons for the Supreme Court to have adopted a Westminster,
as opposed to a Whitehall, vision of reality. First, the assumptions which
support the justifications of aWhitehall vision of representative democracy
have been eroded Second, a Westminster vision of democracy reflects the
justification provided by the Supreme court for the principle of legality, a
principle similar to that used by the Supreme Court in Miller v The Prime
Minister when determining the common law limits on the prerogative
power of prorogation.
Whitehall visions of democracy prioritise the executive, through recognis-
ing that the executive is drawn from the political party with the most seats
in the Commons. The role of the electorate is minimal; to vote for a par-
ticular political party, having read the relevant manifestos setting out what
that political party promises to deliver should it have the privilege of form-
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ing a Government. Deliberation takes place within political parties, further
enabling the electorate to participate in the formation of the policies of the
political party to which they belong. Moreover, if there are two political
parties, the political party with the most seats will also have a majority of
the votes cast, and hence the backing of a majority of the public.
These assumptionswere far frommet in the 2017-19 parliamentary session.
There are not just two major political parties and a Government can obtain
a majority for their political party in the House of Commons without
receiving a majority of votes cast. In 2017-19 the Conservative Party
formed a minority Government, with a confidence and supply agreement
from the DUP. As more Conservative Party backbenchers were prepared
to vote against the Government, the party’s majority was reduced as the
whip was removed from some and others resigned their party membership
and joined other political parties. The 2017-19 also saw a large number
of Ministerial resignations over Brexit issues. Furthermore, most of the
electorate are not members of political parties.86 There also appears to be
little evidence of deliberation within political parties as to the adoption of
key policy issues. This can be illustrated by the volte-face in Governmental
policy following the change of leadership of the Conservative Party – and
hence the holder of the office of Prime Minister – from Theresa May to
Boris Johnson. Whilst itmay be claimed that ‘getting Brexit done’ is ameans
of ensuring the achievement of the outcome of the Brexit referendum of
2016, nevertheless the referendum did not provide a clear account of the
direction of travel, particularly given reports from the Welsh and Scottish
Governments in favour of a softer form of Brexit than that negotiated by
Theresa May and, later, Boris Johnson.87
In addition, further normative support for the Westminster vision of
democracy can be seen in the justification provided by Lord Hoffmann for
the principle of legality:
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it
chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human
rights…The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are
86 See Ben Westerman, ‘The Inner Workings of British Political Parties: The Interaction
of Organisational Structures and their Impact on Political Behaviours’ (The Constitu-
tional Society, 2020) <https://consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Westerman-
The-Inner-Workings-of-British-Political-Parties.pdf> accessed 9 May 2020.
87 Welsh Government and Plaid Cymru, ‘Securing Wales’ Future: Transition
from the European Union to a New Relationship’ (Welsh Government, 2017)
<https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-01/30683%20Securing%20Wales%C2%
B9%20Future_ENGLISH_WEB.pdf> accessed 13 December 2020; Scottish Gov-
ernment, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (Scottish Government, 20 December 2016)
<https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-place-europe/> accessed 9 May 2020.
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ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality
means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing
and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot
be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is
because there is too great a risk that the full implications of
their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed by the
democratic process. In the absence of express language or
necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore
presume that even the most general words were intended to
be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way
the courts of theUnitedKingdom, through acknowledging the
sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality
little different from those which exist in countries where the
power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional
document.88
This justification is more viable under a Westminster, as opposed to a
Whitehall, vision of democracy. It assumes a Parliament that is able to
carry on a full democratic scrutiny, such that there is a general consensus in
favour of restricting human rights. Under aWhitehall vision of democracy,
all that would be needed is a strong wish of the executive to restrict these
rights. In addition, the principle of legality has a stronger justification in
a political system that facilitates deliberation, where there is an ability for
Government, backbench and opposition MPs to provide information from
a wide range of sources, balancing the need for human rights against the
justification for their restriction.
The Supreme Court did not apply the principle of legality in Miller v The
Prime Minister because it concerned the extent of a prerogative, not a
statutory power, and the principle of legality is traditionally understood as a
principle of statutory interpretation in addition to a constitutional principle.
Nevertheless, when determining the extent to which the common law
placed limits on the extent of the prerogative power of prorogation, the
Supreme Court found it of ‘some assistance to consider how the courts
have dealt with situations where the exercise of a power conferred by
statute, rather than one arising under the prerogative, was liable to affect
the operation of a constitutional principle’.89 This would imply that a
justification similar to the principle of legality underpins the court’s ability
to determine the common law limits over prerogative powers. If anything,
these prerogative powers may require a stricter application of common law
limits. Whilst there has been democratic deliberation to set the limits of a
88 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131.
89 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [49].
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statutory power, no such democratic deliberation takes place to determine
the limits of a prerogative power.90
This section is not intended to provide a complete defence of theWestmin-
ster over the Whitehall vision of democracy which would require a more
detailed historical and normative analysis. Rather, it is intended to justify
the Supreme Court’s support of a Westminster interpretation of represen-
tative democracy in Miller v The Prime Minister. I have argued that this is a
better reflection of the political circumstances at the time of the proroga-
tion, as well as this being a better fit with the normative justification of the
principle of legality and its analogous application to the scope of prerogative
powers. Surely it is better for the Court to adopt a vision of representative
democracy that better reflects the particular set of facts presented in the
specific case before it than to adopt a vision that it thinks best reflects the
constitution as a whole, or of the constitution in 1689, or another perceived
important historical moment in the evolution of the UK constitution.
4 Justiciability: Legal or Political?
When I discussed arguments from instrumental and epistemic deference
above, I argued that there was a need to go beyond debate as to whether
the Supreme Court in Miller v The Prime Minister converted a convention
into law, or whether the Court wrongly controlled the exercise of a
non-justiciable prerogative power. Both of these questions raise deeper
issues as to the proper role of the court – when is a prerogative power
justiciable and what is the appropriate standard of review? The debate
illustrates the tension between a preference for legal and political controls.
Those criticising the judgment frequently advocate a preference for political
controls, minimising the role of the courts. Those supportive of the
judgment tend to prefer legal controls, recognising the importance of the
courts in preventing the executive from abusing its powers.
This theme runs through the six criticisms I discussed at the beginning
of this chapter. Those who criticise the judgment do so because of a
preference for political controls, either specifically over the prerogative
power of prorogation or more generally. If the court misunderstood the
facts, this demonstrates its institutional inability, political institutions being
more suited to carrying out these factual assessments. If the Supreme Court
granted an inappropriate remedy, this was because it strayed from its legal
sphere, as set out in the Bill of Rights 1689. If it is for the Monarch or
Parliament, either separately or together, to control the prerogative power
of prorogation, it is because their political control is to be preferred to the
90 Craig (n 9).
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legal control provided by Parliament. Similarly, if the prerogative power of
prorogation is non-justiciable, it is because it should be controlled through
political and not legal means; or because conventions are political and
not legal; or because courts only control existence and not the exercise of
prerogative powers to ensure that they do not interferewith better, political
controls.
These arguments will not be revisited in this section, Rather, it will provide
an alternative normative justification for the Supreme Court’s decision. I
will argue that merely examining whether legal or political controls are a
better means of controlling the executive provides an incomplete account
of the constitution. It is also important to recognise how political and legal
controls interact. When analysed from this perspective, there is a further
normative justification for the decision.
In previous work, I have argued that inter-institutional interactions can
serve two purposes, constitutional counterbalancing and constitutional col-
laboration.91 Constitutional collaboration aims to ensure the development
of better standards of control over decisions of the executive by focusing on
the relative institutional and constitutional characteristics of legal and polit-
ical institutions. Institutional features refer to the composition and powers
of different institutions. These considerations feature in an assessment of
institutional and epistemic deference, focusing on the ability of institutions
to obtain information and their relative expertise in assessing this informa-
tion. The constitutional characteristics draw on features of institutions to
determine the constitutional legitimacy of their actions. For example, it is
more legitimate for democratically accountable bodies to balance compet-
ing interests than it is for non-democratically accountable bodies to perform
this function. In contrast, it is more legitimate for courts, who benefit from
judicial independence, to resolve disputes concerning legal rights that take
place between individuals and the administration or between individuals
and the executive. The independence of the judiciary ensures a lack of po-
tential bias in such decisions that might occur were the executive to decide
cases concerning the scope of its own powers.
Constitutional counter-balancing focuses on a different purpose of inter-
institutional interactions. The UK does not have a codified constitution,
with aspects of the UK constitution instead being regulated through legis-
lation, the common law, conventions and rules of practice and procedure.
We often focus on this feature when analysing the consequences of parlia-
mentary sovereignty. If it is not possible for one Parliament to limit the
law-making powers of its successors then, in turn, it is not possible to have
a codified constitution which places legally enforceable limits on the law-
91 Alison L Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (OUP 2017), ch 3.
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making powers of a future Parliament. In addition, the lack of a codified
constitution means that the separation of powers, whilst recognised as a
constitutional principle, has not played a key role as an aspect of consti-
tutional design in the UK. Rather, the relative roles of the legislature, the
executive and the courts have evolved over time. Constitutional counter-
balancing is one aspect of this evolution. It refers to interactions where one
institution believes that another has transgressed its constitutional role, to
the detriment of that institution. In these circumstances, it can be justi-
fied for that institution to push back against this transgression by the other
institution. This can occur pre-emptively, in order to establish limits, in
addition to being in response to an action from another institution.
Miller v The Prime Minister provides a further example of constitutional
counterbalancing. This is an example of an institution acting to prevent
the actions of another institution from eroding the powers not of itself,
but of another governmental institution; in other words, the constitutional
counterbalancing protects the powers of a third party. This is not novel.
The Fire Brigades Union case may also best be explained in this manner.92
The justification for providing a broad interpretation of a commencement
provision also rests on ensuring the powers of the legislature are not
usurped by the executive. Parliament had devised a compensation scheme
set out in legislation that the Minister had the power to bring into force.
To use the prerogative to bring in a less generous scheme frustrated the
will of the legislature in a manner where it would have been difficult, if
not impossible, for the legislature to have prevented the executive from
acting in this manner. In Miller v The Prime Minister, the Supreme Court
is exercising constitutional counterbalancing in order to protect the powers
of the legislature from being illegitimately eroded by the executive. Here, as
above, I understand the legislature to consist predominantly of backbench
and opposition MPs, although I accept that the legislature also includes
members of the House of Lords who are not members of the Government.
The executive consists of governmental Ministers.
When, if at all, is it legitimate for the court to interfere to protect the
rights of the legislature from erosion by the executive? There are four
criteria. First, the encroachment of the executive over the powers of the
legislature, or the potential erosion of the legislature’s constitutional role
must be manifestly serious in order to justify intervention by the court to
protect the powers of the legislature. Second, the legislature must be unable
to defend the erosion of its constitutional role by the executive. Third, the
intrusion of the executive over the powers of the legislature must give rise
92 Fire Brigades Union (n 63). See also Eric Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional
Government’ [1995] Public Law 599.
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to serious legal, political, social or constitutional consequences. Fourth, the
actions of the court to defend the legislature from intrusion by acts of the
executive must not increase the powers of the court. Rather, they must
be designed to ensure that the powers of the legislature are bolstered from
erosion by acts of the executive.
All four of these criteria were satisfied inMiller v The Prime Minister. First,
I agree with the assessment of the Supreme Court as to the serious nature
of this particular prorogation. Parliament was prorogued for five out of
the eight weeks of what was then the remaining time to the end of the art
50 negotiation period. As discussed above, the legislature had been given
a role to play in the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement through
the provisions of s 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In
addition, there was clear evidence that the legislature did not agree with
the then policy choice of the Government to leave the EU on 31 October
2019, even if this meant leaving with no deal. The House of Commons had
repeatedly voted against leaving the EUwith no deal, in addition to enacting
legislation to require the Prime Minister to seek an extension to the art 50
process in order to prevent the UK from leaving the EU with no deal.93
Second, the legislature was not in a position to defend its own constitu-
tional powers from erosion by the executive. Whilst I accept that the Gov-
ernment did provide notice of its intention to prorogue Parliament, giving
Parliament an ability to hold the Government to account for its actions, the
only realistic means of doing so is to hold a vote of no confidence under the
Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, including the 14-day period in which a
possible vote of confidence could be held in a Government prior to the call-
ing of a general election. Given the short time in which Parliament would
have been sitting between the announcement of the prorogation and the
dates announced for the potential start of that prorogation, and the art 50
deadline that could not be unilaterally extended by either the UK legislature
or the executive, the legislature had little realistic opportunity to defend its
own constitutional position. Instead, the legislature had to choose between
a vote of no confidence and the risk of a general election leading to the UK
leaving the EU with no deal, or enacting legislation aiming to prevent the
UK leaving the EU with no deal. It is not for the courts to indirectly evalu-
ate the policy choice of the legislature to decide to prefer to act to preserve
its intention that the UK should not leave the EU with no deal rather than
to issue a vote of no confidence in the Government. Yet, if the Supreme
Court had concluded that there were no limits on the extent of the preroga-
tive power of prorogation, it may have indirectly influenced the legislature’s
choice.
93 EuropeanUnion (Withdrawal) Act 2019; EuropeanUnion (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019.
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Third, it is hard to dispute the serious legal, political, social and constitu-
tional consequences of preventing the legislature from scrutinising the ex-
ecutive during the Brexit process. Regardless of one’s views on Brexit, the
UK’s exit from the EU poses one of the largest legal and constitutional chal-
lenges of the 21st century. A failure to ensure that legislation and delegated
legislation operate effectively to achieveBrexit could have large social reper-
cussions. We have alreadywitnessed large political consequences of the ref-
erendum outcome and the failure to achieve Brexit by the original deadline
imposed by art 50 of the TEU. Brexit will also have constitutional conse-
quences, not least as regards the restriction of the primacy of EU-derived
law to legislation enacted prior to implementation period completion (‘IP
Completion’) date,94 in addition to the removal of the EU’s Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and Freedoms that will no longer be recognised as a part
of domestic law post IP Completion date.95
Fourth, the court only acted to preserve the powers of the legislature from
erosion by the executive. The limits placed on prorogation by the common
law are designed to protect the legislature, ensuring that parliamentary
sovereignty and parliamentary accountability are not eroded. Moreover,
the court recognises that any interference with parliamentary sovereignty
or parliamentary accountability would have to be ‘sufficiently serious to
justify such an exceptional course’.96 In doing so, the court is restricting
its role to an intervention to protect the legislature, focusing on when the
intrusion by the executive over the constitutional role of the legislature is
sufficient serious to merit such a control.
The Supreme Court also ensured that the executive can provide a ‘reason-
able justification’ for the intrusion over the powers of the legislature. As no
reasons were provided, we are not in a position to know how stringently
the court would have exercised this power of review. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the Court referred to a ‘reasonable’ justification here. In R
(UNISON) v Lord Chancellor, Lord Reed stated that, in circumstances where
legislation specifically empowers the executive to act contrary to fundamen-
tal common law rights, the principle of legality dictates that ‘the degree of
intrusion must not be greater than is justified by the objectives which the
measure is intended to serve’.97 Given the similarities between the common
94 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 5(1)-(3), as amended by the European Union
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020.
95 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 5(4). See also Catherine S Barnard, ‘So Long,
Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu: Brexit and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2019)
82 MLR 350.
96 Miller v The Prime Minister (n 2) [50].
97 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [2017] 3 WLR 409, [88], citing R (Daly) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, [21] (Lord
Bingham).
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law limits on prerogative powers and the principle of legality, the Supreme
Court could have opted for this more stringent test through which to re-
view the reasons provided by the executive for such a serious interference of
parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. The Supreme
Court chose, instead, to adopt a test of reasonable justification in Miller v
The Prime Minister.
In addition, the court is not adding to its powers. It drew on long-
standing case law determining the ability of the court to place limits on
the prerogative powers of the executive. It also drew on earlier case law
providing examples of the common law developing principles to protect
the wider interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty and of parliamentary
accountability, drawing on earlier cases controlling prerogative powers.
The Supreme Court may have developed principles of the common law,
but it did so incrementally. In addition, it did not conclude that the
prerogative power of prorogation was justiciable in terms of controls
over the exercise of the Minister of his discretionary powers found in a
particular prerogative power. It did not evaluate the rationality of the Prime
Minister’s advice to the Monarch to prorogue Parliament. It concluded,
instead, that the prorogation was beyond the limits of the extent of this
prerogative power by the common law, with the Prime Minister failing to
provide a justification for his sufficiently serious erosion of the common law
principles of parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability.
The SupremeCourt is doing nomore than it has done in other caseswhere it
has developed the common law to protect fundamental principles of the UK
constitution. Consequently, I would argue that the decision of the Supreme
Court inMiller v The Prime Minister was normatively justified.
5 Conclusion
It is impossible to conclude anything other than that Miller v The Prime
Minister will be regarded as a key constitutional case. No doubt the
controversy surrounding its justification will continue long into the future.
I have argued in support of the Supreme Court’s decision, recognising
the importance of reading decisions in their context. The outcome of
Miller v The Prime Minister has large political ramifications. But this
does not mean that it was a political judgment, in the sense of being
influenced predominantly by political as opposed to legal considerations.
The Court’s account of the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and
parliamentary accountability demonstrate a preference for a Westminster
as opposed to Whitehall interpretation of representative democracy. But
this is understandable given the context of the decision. The Westminster
interpretation of democracy is a better reflection of the political reality
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at the time the judgment was made. Moreover, a Westminster view of
representative democracy better fits the normative justification for the
principle of legality which was instructive in helping the Supreme Court
reach its judgment. I have also argued that Miller v The Prime Minister
should not be criticised as the courts favouring legal constitutionalism
at the cost of failing to understand the importance of the UK’s political
constitution. Rather, it is better understood as applying a legal standard
of control that is justified in the particular political context. It provides an
example of the courts legitimately using the law to prevent the executive
from undermining the role of the legislature when the legislature was not
realistically in a position to protect itself.
The specific context of Miller v The Prime Minister also explains how,
despite its importance, it is unlikely that the precise set of circumstances
at play in the case will appear again in the near future. This is not to
downgrade its importance. It is part of a line of recent cases where the
Supreme Court has drawn on constitutional principles to place legal limits
on the power of the executive, protecting the constitution by upholding
the separation of powers. This does not provide evidence of the Supreme
Court muscling-in on the proper role of the legislature. Rather, it provides
an example of the Supreme Court setting limits that are sensitive to existing
parliamentary and other political controls, treading carefully to protect the
UK constitution in times of extreme stress.
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